marshall message WWII

Page 1 of 2: Message from Gen. George C. Marshall to Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower on Oct. 5, 1942, regarding Operation TORCH battle plans in Morocco. National Archives. (Prologue)

marshall message WWII

Page 2 of 2: Message from Gen. George C. Marshall to Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower on Oct. 5, 1942, regarding Operation TORCH battle plans in Morocco. National Archives. (Prologue)

Message from Marshall to Eisenhower regarding rules of engagement in fighting Vichy French forces in Operation TORCH

Page 1 of 3: Message from Marshall to Eisenhower regarding rules of engagement in fighting Vichy French forces in Operation TORCH. National Archives. (Chapter 1)

Page 2 of 3: Message from Marshall to Eisenhower regarding rules of engagement in fighting Vichy French forces in Operation TORCH. National Archives. (Chapter 1)

Page 2 of 3: Message from Marshall to Eisenhower regarding rules of engagement in fighting Vichy French forces in Operation TORCH. National Archives. (Chapter 1)

Page 3 of 3: Message from Marshall to Eisenhower regarding rules of engagement in fighting Vichy French forces in Operation TORCH. National Archives. (Chapter 1)

Page 3 of 3: Message from Marshall to Eisenhower regarding rules of engagement in fighting Vichy French forces in Operation TORCH. National Archives. (Chapter 1)

Page 1 of 2: Post-war letter regarding Operation RESERVIST from Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer to Brig. Gen. Paul Robinett, who at the time was assigned to the Army's military history office. National Archives. (Chapter 2)

Page 1 of 2: Post-war letter regarding Operation RESERVIST from Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer to Brig. Gen. Paul Robinett, who at the time was assigned to the Army’s military history office. National Archives. (Chapter 2)

Page 2 of 2: Post-war letter regarding Operation RESERVIST from Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer to Brig. Gen. Paul Robinett, who at the time was assigned to the Army's military history office. National Archives. (Chapter 2)

Page 2 of 2: Post-war letter regarding Operation RESERVIST from Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer to Brig. Gen. Paul Robinett, who at the time was assigned to the Army’s military history office. National Archives. (Chapter 2)

Page 1 of 4: Initial pages of Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark's official 1943 account of his armistice negotiations with French officials. National Archives. (Chapter 3)

Page 1 of 4: Initial pages of Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark’s official 1943 account of his armistice negotiations with French officials. National Archives. (Chapter 3)

Page 2 of 4: Initial pages of Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark's official 1943 account of his armistice negotiations with French officials. National Archives. (Chapter 3)

Page 2 of 4: Initial pages of Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark’s official 1943 account of his armistice negotiations with French officials. National Archives. (Chapter 3)

Page 3 of 4: Initial pages of Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark's official 1943 account of his armistice negotiations with French officials. National Archives. (Chapter 3)

Page 3 of 4: Initial pages of Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark’s official 1943 account of his armistice negotiations with French officials. National Archives. (Chapter 3)

Page 4 of 4: Initial pages of Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark's official 1943 account of his armistice negotiations with French officials. National Archives. (Chapter 3)

Page 4 of 4: Initial pages of Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark’s official 1943 account of his armistice negotiations with French officials. National Archives. (Chapter 3)

Page 1 of 2: Lt. Gen. Kenneth A.N. Anderson's letter to Eisenhower ("My dear C-in-C") regarding the failed attack at Tebourba in northern Tunisia, in early December 1943. In his handwritten postscript, Anderson apologizes for seeming "rather pessimistic." Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. (Chapter 5)

Page 1 of 2: Lt. Gen. Kenneth A.N. Anderson’s letter to Eisenhower (“My dear C-in-C”) regarding the failed attack at Tebourba in northern Tunisia, in early December 1943. In his handwritten postscript, Anderson apologizes for seeming “rather pessimistic.” Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. (Chapter 5)

Page 2 of 2: Lt. Gen. Kenneth A.N. Anderson's letter to Eisenhower ("My dear C-in-C") regarding the failed attack at Tebourba in northern Tunisia, in early December 1943. In his handwritten postscript, Anderson apologizes for seeming "rather pessimistic." Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. (Chapter 5)

Page 2 of 2: Lt. Gen. Kenneth A.N. Anderson’s letter to Eisenhower (“My dear C-in-C”) regarding the failed attack at Tebourba in northern Tunisia, in early December 1943. In his handwritten postscript, Anderson apologizes for seeming “rather pessimistic.” Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. (Chapter 5)

Page 1 of 2: Anderson's letter to Eisenhower on Jan. 1, 1943, a week after failed attempt to take Longstop Hill. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 6)

Page 1 of 2: Anderson’s letter to Eisenhower on Jan. 1, 1943, a week after failed attempt to take Longstop Hill. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 6)

Page 2 of 2: Anderson's letter to Eisenhower on Jan. 1, 1943, a week after failed attempt to take Longstop Hill. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 6)

Page 2 of 2: Anderson’s letter to Eisenhower on Jan. 1, 1943, a week after failed attempt to take Longstop Hill. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 6)

Page 1 of 4: Maj. Gen. George S. Patton's memo to Eisenhower on Jan. 2, 1943, regarding French theories on the assassination of Adm. Darlan. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 6)

Page 1 of 4: Maj. Gen. George S. Patton’s memo to Eisenhower on Jan. 2, 1943, regarding French theories on the assassination of Adm. Darlan. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 6)

Page 2 of 4: Maj. Gen. George S. Patton's memo to Eisenhower on Jan. 2, 1943, regarding French theories on the assassination of Adm. Darlan. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 6)

Page 2 of 4: Maj. Gen. George S. Patton’s memo to Eisenhower on Jan. 2, 1943, regarding French theories on the assassination of Adm. Darlan. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 6)

Page 3 of 4: Maj. Gen. George S. Patton's memo to Eisenhower on Jan. 2, 1943, regarding French theories on the assassination of Adm. Darlan. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 6)

Page 3 of 4: Maj. Gen. George S. Patton’s memo to Eisenhower on Jan. 2, 1943, regarding French theories on the assassination of Adm. Darlan. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 6)

Page 4 of 4: Maj. Gen. George S. Patton's memo to Eisenhower on Jan. 2, 1943, regarding French theories on the assassination of Adm. Darlan. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 6)

Page 4 of 4: Maj. Gen. George S. Patton’s memo to Eisenhower on Jan. 2, 1943, regarding French theories on the assassination of Adm. Darlan. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 6)

Minutes of Jan. 16, 1943 meeting between President Roosevelt and his senior military officers at Casablanca.

Page 1 of 6: Minutes of Jan. 16, 1943 meeting between President Roosevelt and his senior military officers at Casablanca. Marshall discloses to the president that an invasion of Sicily, Operation HUSKY, seems likely as the next Allied move after the North African campaign. National Archives. (Chapter 7)

Minutes of Jan. 16, 1943 meeting between President Roosevelt and his senior military officers at Casablanca.

Page 2 of 6: Minutes of Jan. 16, 1943 meeting between President Roosevelt and his senior military officers at Casablanca. Marshall discloses to the president that an invasion of Sicily, Operation HUSKY, seems likely as the next Allied move after the North African campaign. National Archives. (Chapter 7)

Minutes of Jan. 16, 1943 meeting between President Roosevelt and his senior military officers at Casablanca.

Page 3 of 6: Minutes of Jan. 16, 1943 meeting between President Roosevelt and his senior military officers at Casablanca. Marshall discloses to the president that an invasion of Sicily, Operation HUSKY, seems likely as the next Allied move after the North African campaign. National Archives. (Chapter 7)

Minutes of Jan. 16, 1943 meeting between President Roosevelt and his senior military officers at Casablanca.

Page 4 of 6: Minutes of Jan. 16, 1943 meeting between President Roosevelt and his senior military officers at Casablanca. Marshall discloses to the president that an invasion of Sicily, Operation HUSKY, seems likely as the next Allied move after the North African campaign. National Archives. (Chapter 7)

Minutes of Jan. 16, 1943 meeting between President Roosevelt and his senior military officers at Casablanca.

Page 5 of 6: Minutes of Jan. 16, 1943 meeting between President Roosevelt and his senior military officers at Casablanca. Marshall discloses to the president that an invasion of Sicily, Operation HUSKY, seems likely as the next Allied move after the North African campaign. National Archives. (Chapter 7)

Minutes of Jan. 16, 1943 meeting between President Roosevelt and his senior military officers at Casablanca.

Page 6 of 6: Minutes of Jan. 16, 1943 meeting between President Roosevelt and his senior military officers at Casablanca. Marshall discloses to the president that an invasion of Sicily, Operation HUSKY, seems likely as the next Allied move after the North African campaign. National Archives. (Chapter 7)

Memo to Eisenhower from Truscott, Jan. 23, 1943

Page 1 of 2: Memo to Eisenhower from Truscott, Jan. 23, 1943, regarding deficiencies of French troops deployed in Tunisia. George C. Marshall Library. (Chapter 8)

Memo to Eisenhower from Truscott, Jan. 23, 1943

Page 2 of 2: Memo to Eisenhower from Truscott, Jan. 23, 1943, regarding deficiencies of French troops deployed in Tunisia. George C. Marshall Library. (Chapter 8)

Memo to Eisenhower from Truscott, Feb. 12, 1943

Page 1 of 3: Memo to Eisenhower from Truscott, Feb. 12, 1943, on the eve of the German attack toward Kasserine Pass, asserting that “in one respect only have Axis forces demonstrated superiority.” George C. Marshall Library. (Chapter 8)

Memo to Eisenhower from Truscott, Feb. 12, 1943

Page 2 of 3: Memo to Eisenhower from Truscott, Feb. 12, 1943, on the eve of the German attack toward Kasserine Pass, asserting that “in one respect only have Axis forces demonstrated superiority.” George C. Marshall Library. (Chapter 8)

Memo to Eisenhower from Truscott, Feb. 12, 1943

Page 3 of 3: Memo to Eisenhower from Truscott, Feb. 12, 1943, on the eve of the German attack toward Kasserine Pass, asserting that “in one respect only have Axis forces demonstrated superiority.” George C. Marshall Library. (Chapter 8)

Letter from Eisenhower to Fredendall in early February 1943

Page 1 of 2: Letter from Eisenhower to Fredendall in early February 1943, voicing concern about “the habit of some of our generals in staying too close to their command posts.” Fredendall read selected portions of this letter to Ward. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 8)

Letter from Eisenhower to Fredendall in early February 1943

Page 2 of 2: Letter from Eisenhower to Fredendall in early February 1943, voicing concern about “the habit of some of our generals in staying too close to their command posts.” Fredendall read selected portions of this letter to Ward. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 8)

Letter from Eisenhower to Fredendall in early February 1943

Page 1 of 2: Letter from Eisenhower to Fredendall in early February 1943, voicing concern about “the habit of some of our generals in staying too close to their command posts.” Fredendall read selected portions of this letter to Ward. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 8)Eisenhower message to Maj. Gen. Omar Bradley on Apr. 16, 1943, regarding the impending assault on the final Axis bridgehead around Tunis and Bizerte. Eisenhower’s reference to “quite severe criticism” of the 1st Armored and 34th Infantry Divisions is an allusion to the units’ spotty performance at Maknassy and Fondouk, respectively. U.S. Army Military History Institute. (Chapter 12)

Letter from Eisenhower to Fredendall in early February 1943

Page 2 of 2: Letter from Eisenhower to Fredendall in early February 1943, voicing concern about “the habit of some of our generals in staying too close to their command posts.” Fredendall read selected portions of this letter to Ward. Eisenhower Library. (Chapter 8)Eisenhower message to Maj. Gen. Omar Bradley on Apr. 16, 1943, regarding the impending assault on the final Axis bridgehead around Tunis and Bizerte. Eisenhower’s reference to “quite severe criticism” of the 1st Armored and 34th Infantry Divisions is an allusion to the units’ spotty performance at Maknassy and Fondouk, respectively. U.S. Army Military History Institute. (Chapter 12)